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COMMENTS
"DISABLING" WORKERS' COMPENSATION
EXCLUSIVITY: ENABLING CALIFORNIA
WORKERS TO FILE WORK-RELATED
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN
STATE COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Workers' Compensation Act' ("WCA" or
"Workers' Compensation Act") provides an exclusive system
of compensation for workers injured in the course and scope
of their employment.2 Created to benefit both the employer
and the injured worker, the California workers' compensation
system provides workers with the opportunity to attain full
and swift compensation for work-related injuries without re-
gard to fault while relieving employers of the burden of po-
tentially large civil damage awards.' Traditionally, this pre-
sumed "compensation bargain"4 has been interpreted broadly
to extend to claims of discrimination based on a work-related
injury which results in a disability, making the workers'
compensation system a worker's exclusive remedy for such a
discrimination claim.
Until recently, California courts uniformly agreed that
the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions applied to
work-related disability discrimination claims and, specifi-
cally, that section 132a of the California Labor Code,' part of
the Workers' Compensation Act, provided a worker's exclu-
1. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
3. See Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 214 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App.
1985).
4. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
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sive remedy for his or her discrimination claim based on a
disability arising out of a work-related injury.6 Conversely,
claims of discrimination based on a nonwork-related injury
giving rise to a disability had traditionally been unaction-
able.7 However, in 1992, with the advent of the Federal
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),8 California
amended its Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") to
provide employees with protection against discrimination
based on a disability. Therefore, as of the 1992 amendment,
a worker has been able to bring a claim against his or her
employer for disability discrimination with the Department
of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") when the dis-
ability arises out of an injury that is not work-related.9 In
most cases, a disabled worker is now protected from dis-
crimination based on his or her disability, irrespective of how
he or she becomes disabled.
However, the FEHA was amended again in 1993 to pro-
vide that its provisions are to preempt any provision of state
law providing less protection to an employee than the FEHA
does." The 1993 amendment makes the FEHA the exception
to other laws." Now, it is to control whenever another state
law provides less protection. Subsequent to this amendment,
it has been argued that the workers' compensation laws pro-
vide less protection to workers and, therefore, that even a
worker with a work-related disability can take advantage of
the more liberal protections extended by the FEHA. 2 How-
6. See discussion infra Parts II.C, IV.A.I.a. Disability discrimination
claims where the underlying injury resulting in a disability is not work-related
(i.e. where the injury is suffered off-the-job) are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing. See discussion infra Part
IV.A.I.b.
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. The FEHA has not always protected
employees from discrimination based on a disability. It was not until the pas-
sage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, infra note 8, that mental
and physical disabilities were protected at all. The FEHA adopted disabilities
as part of its protection in 1992. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
8. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
9. The FEHA is applicable to employers with five or more employees.
Therefore, employees who work for employers with less than five employees
cannot take advantage of the protections provided under the FEHA. See CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12926(d) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) ("Employer' includes any
person regularly employing five or more persons .... ").
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
11. Id.
12. See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
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ever, in two appellate court cases decided since the enact-
ment of the 1993 amendment to the FEHA-both dealing
with disability discrimination--one court has held that the
workers' compensation system is still an employee's exclusive
remedy, while the other has read the amendment to permit
an employee to sue for civil damages under the FEHA.13 This
split makes it unclear under which remedial system an em-
ployee who is discriminated against based on a work-related
disability can pursue his or her discrimination claim.
This comment first traces the development of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act 4 and how a broad reading of section
132a of the California Labor Code,"5 read in conjunction with
the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation
laws, has come to apply to work-related disability discrimi-
nation claims. 7 Next, this comment discusses the develop-
ment of the Fair Employment and Housing Act" and how the
recent amendments to the FEHA,9 made, at least partly, in
light of the passage of the ADA,20 affect work-related and
nonwork-related disability discrimination claims. Then, this
comment outlines the development of case law implicating
discrimination claims brought by employees against their
employers, both prior and subsequent to the recent amend-
ments to the FEHA."
Further, this comment analyzes the effect of the recent
amendments to the FEHA on work-related disability dis-
crimination claims2 2 and, specifically, the reasoning of the
courts in Cammack v. GTE California Inc.23 and City of
Moorpark v. Superior Court,24 the two conflicting cases on
this issue recently decided by California appellate courts. It
13. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); Cammack v. GTE Cali-
fornia, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968
(Cal. Nov. 26, 1996).
14. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
15. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
16. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600-3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.4-5.
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
20. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
21. See discussion infra Part II.C.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
23. 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
24. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 1996).
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is argued that the recent amendments to the FEHA preempt
the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act,
thereby giving an employee with a work-related disability for
which he or she has been discriminated against the option to
sue his or her employer under the FEHA for civil damages."
This comment proposes that, in deciding this issue, the
California Supreme Court reject the rationale of the Cam-
mack court and follow that of the City of Moorpark court to
permit the application of the FEHA to all disability discrimi-
nation claims over which it has jurisdiction, including those
where the injury giving rise to the disability is work-related.26
Also proposed is giving the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board27 and the Department of Fair Employment and Hous-
ing" concurrent jurisdiction over work-related disability
claims so as to provide employees the option to sue under the
FEHA or WCA.29 Finally, this comment offers some practical
suggestions on how workers with a work-related disability
discrimination claim should proceed in light of the current
flux in the law."°
II. BACKGROUND
Recent California appellate court decisions have resulted
in conflicting conclusions on the issue of whether state Fair
Employment and Housing Act disability discrimination
claims are preempted by the exclusive jurisdiction provisions
of the Workers' Compensation Act."' In order to better un-
derstand these recent decisions and their implications on
employment litigation, it is necessary to closely examine the
two intersecting branches of worker-protection laws in Cali-
25. See discussion infra Part V.B.
26. See discussion infra Part V.
27. CAL. LAB. CODE § 111 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998). The Workers' Com-
pensation Appeals Board ("WCAB") is the administrative body created to deal
with workers' compensation claims. Id.
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12901 (West 1989). The Department of Fair Em-
ployment and Housing ("DFEH") is the administrative body created to deal
with discrimination claims, including those for disability discrimination. Id.
29. See discussion infra Part V.
30. See discussion infra Part V.
31. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); Cammack v. GTE Cali-
fornia, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968
(Cal. Nov. 26, 1996).
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fornia at issue-the California Workers' Compensation Act, 2
governing workplace injuries, and the Fair Employment and
Housing Act,"3 governing workplace discrimination.
A. The Purpose of California's Workers' Compensation Laws
and Legislative Intent of the Workers' Compensation Act
1. Overview of the Workers' Compensation Act
California's workers' compensation laws provide exten-
sive and liberal protection to the state's workers. 4 This pro-
tection extends to virtually all employees35 working within
the state.36 The primary purpose of the workers' compensa-
tion statutes is to ensure that an employee injured in the
course of his or her employment, and those dependent on him
or her, have adequate means of sustenance while the em-
ployee is unable to work.37 In addition, the laws are aimed at
promoting the employee's prompt recovery so that he or she
can return to productive employment.38
2. Constitutional Basis for California's Workers'
Compensation Act
The California Constitution sets forth the intent of the
people to establish a system of workers' compensation. 9 Ar-
ticle XIV, section 4, empowers the California Legislature to
enact legislation
to create and enforce[ ] a complete system of workers'
40compensation ... and in that behalf[,] to create and en-
32. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 132a, 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
34. David W. O'Brien & Bernadette M. O'Brien, Workers' Compensation
Claims and Benefits, in 1 CALIFORNIA EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK SERIES
1, 1 (7th ed. 1990) [hereinafter O'Brien].
35. An "employee" is defined as "every person in the service of an employer
under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or im-
plied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed ...." CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3351 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
36. O'Brien, supra note 34, at 1.
37. 1 ALAN ESKENAZI ET AL., CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE: WORKERS'
COMPENSATION § 1:1 (2d ed. 1993).
38. Id.
39. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
40. A complete system of workers' compensation includes:
adequate provisions for the comfort, health and safety and general wel-
fare of any and all persons to compensate any or all of their workers
for injury or disability ... in the course of their employment, irrespec-
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force a liability on the part of any or all of their workers
for injury or disability, and their dependents for death in-
curred or sustained by the said workers in the course of
41their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party.
Further, the California Constitution reflects the intent of
the people to create a workers' compensation system which
operates to accomplish "substantial justice in all cases expe-
ditiously, inexpensively, and without encumbrance.' 2
In the early 1900s, the California Legislature enacted
statutes that are the basis of the current Workers' Compen-
sation Act. 43  These early enactments developed into the
Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act of
1917. 44 In 1937, this Act was restated and codified in the
California Labor Code.45 Over the last century, subsequent
amendments and revisions to the WCA have been made.
However, these amendments and revisions have not affected
the basic premise of the workers' compensation system: to
provide assistance to workers injured in the course and scope
of their employment.46
3. Purpose Behind the Workers' Compensation Act
The Workers' Compensation Act 47 seeks to ensure that
California workers are afforded full and swift compensation
for injuries suffered in the course of their employment with-
out regard to fault.4" The WCA balances the worker's interest
tive of the fault of any party; also full provision for securing safety in
places of employment; full provision for such medical, surgical, hospital
and other remedial treatment as is requisite to cure and relieve from
the effects of such injury; full provision for adequate insurance cover-
age against liability to pay or furnish compensation ... and full provi-
sion for vesting power, authority and jurisdiction in an administrative
body with all the requisite governmental functions to determine any
dispute or matter arising under such legislation ....
Id.
41. Id. "The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary power,
unlimited by any provision of this constitution, to create, and enforce a com-
plete system of workers' compensation, by appropriate legislation. . . " Id.
42. Id.
43. ESKENAZI, supra note 37, § 1:3.
44. Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act, ch. 586, 1917 Cal.
Stat. 831 (1917) (codified as amended in CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West
1989 & Supp. 1998)).
45. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
46. See Mathews v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 493 P.2d 1165
(Cal. 1972).
47. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
48. See Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 214 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (Ct.
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in a speedy no-fault determination of his or her claims for
injury against the right to litigate for damages in a trial
court.49 In exchange for assuming no-fault liability for inju-
ries caused by the employee's work, an employer is relieved of
the burden of potentially large civil action damage awards. °
At least in theory, both the employee and employer benefit
from this system. The employee receives swift and certain
compensation for his or her injury and the employer is re-
lieved of the prospect of a large civil verdict.5
One of the principal goals of the workers' compensation
system is to ensure an employee receives medical treatment
for his or her work-related injury and compensation for the
time he or she is unable to work.5" Therefore, the purpose of
providing an employee who has suffered a work-related in-
jury with compensation is not to make the injured employee
whole, but rather, to prevent the employee from going on wel-
fare while disabled.53 This is why both the amount and type
of damages recoverable in the workers' compensation system
are limited.54
4. Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Provisions
a. Liberal Construction of the Workers'
Compensation Act
The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are in-
tended to be liberally construed in order to extend its benefits
to injured employees." In order to effectuate the broad re-
App. 1985).
49. See Raven v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 262 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (Ct.
App. 1989) (citing Portillo v. G.T. Price Prods., Inc., 182 Cal. Rptr. 291, 293 (Ct.
App. 1982)).
50. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054, 1062 (Cal. 1990). Essentially, an
employer is limited to providing payment of an employee's reasonable medical
expenses and compensation for a percentage of the employee's lost wages based
on the duration and extent of the employee's disability. See O'Brien, supra note
34, at 3.
51. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054, 1062 (Cal. 1990). California work-
ers' compensation laws provide for payment of medical treatment, temporary
disability benefits, indemnity, permanent disability ratings and death benefits.
See 1 STANFORD D. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 1,
at 1-4 (5th ed. 1995).
52. See O'Brien, supra note 34, at 1.
53. 1 M. KIRBY WILCOX, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW § 20.01, at 20-8
(1996).
54. Id. at 20-9.
55. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1989); see 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW
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medial purpose of workers' compensation laws, the California
Legislature has promulgated section 3202 of the California
Labor Code, which requires that provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act be construed liberally by the courts.56 The
California Supreme Court has interpreted this liberal con-
struction mandate in a way which "favor[s]... awarding
workers' compensation, not . . .permitting civil litigation."'
Therefore, even in situations where an employee could better
benefit from bringing his or her claim in a civil court, he or
she will likely be precluded from doing so. 8 While this may
present a sort of double-edged sword, to comport with the
stated purpose of the workers' compensation laws,59 it is nec-
essary to ensure that an employee is compensated for his or
her work-related injury.
b. Workers' Compensation Exclusivity
Because the goal of workers' compensation is to provide
employees with swift and certain compensation for their
work related injuries,' ° the workers' compensation system
seeks to keep as much of the employee-employer injury
claims and related matters within the framework and juris-
diction of the Workers' Compensation Act as possible.61
Therefore, with only certain exceptions," the Workers' Com-
pensation Act establishes an exclusive system of compensa-
OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 8.02, at 8-13 (2d ed.
1987).
56. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1989) ("This division... shall be liberally
construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the pro-
tection of persons injured in the course of their employment.").
57. Arriaga v. County of Alameda, 892 P.2d 150, 152 (Cal. 1995) (citing
Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Ct. App. 1975)).
58. Id.
59. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
60. Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 214 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (Ct. App.
1985).
61. Id.
62. There are statutorily created exceptions to the exclusivity provision of
the workers' compensation laws. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054
(Cal. 1990) (whistleblower statute). Additionally, those risks not reasonably
encompassed within the compensation bargain have been held to be outside the
workers' compensation laws. See, e.g., Accardi v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr.
2d 292 (Ct. App. 1993) (sexual harassment); Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 265
Cal Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1989) (religious discrimination); Meninga v. Raley's,
Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1989) (sex discrimination); Watson v. Depart-
ment of Rehabilitation, 261 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Ct. App. 1989) (age and race dis-
crimination); Jones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 244 Cal. Rptr. 37
(Ct. App. 1988) (race discrimination).
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tion for workers injured in the course of their employment.63
Section 3600 of the California Labor Code provides that an
employer's liability for workers' compensation is in lieu of
any other liability.64 Section 3602 of the Labor Code provides
that the right to recover against an employer under the
Workers' Compensation Act is generally the employee's ex-
clusive remedy."
The legal theory supporting this exclusive remedy provi-
sion is the presumed compensation bargain between an em-
ployer and his or her employee. In this bargain, the em-
ployer assumes liability for work-related personal injuries or
death, irrespective of fault, in exchange for the limitation on
the amount of that liability, while the employee is afforded
relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or re-
lieve the effects of a work-related injury without having to
prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of
damages potentially available in tort.67 According to one
commentator, the basic theory behind these exclusivity provi-
sions is to further the idea "that an employer who has com-
plied with the law by securing payment of benefits through
insurance, permissible self-insurance, or in the case of a pub-
lic agency, legal uninsurance, should be immune from tort ac-
tions brought by injured workers, their dependents, or
heirs."68
5. Section 132a of the California Labor Code
Adopted in 1941,69 section 132a of the California Labor
Code ("section 132a") makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an employee who has been injured in
63. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
64. Id. § 3600 ("Liability for the compensation provided by this division [is]
in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person except as otherwise spe-
cifically provided in Sections 3602, 3706, and 4558 ....").
65. Id. § 3602 ("Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section
3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation is, except as specifically
provided in this section and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive
remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer .....
66. See Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).
67. See Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 872 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994); Shoemaker v. My-
ers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court,
612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dep't, 729 P.2d 743
(Cal. 1987).
68. HERLICK, supra note 51, at 1-4.
69. 1941 Cal. Stat. 1686 (A.B. 640).
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the course of his or her employment.7" In 1972, this section
was amended to declare a general policy of the State of Cali-
fornia that there should not be discrimination against work-
ers injured in the course and scope of their employment.7' In
1978, it was further amended to provide for reinstatement
and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused
by an employer's discriminatory acts, which were in addition
to the increased compensation award that section 132a al-
ready had provided.72 Currently, section 132a reads, in rele-
vant part:
It is the declared policy of this state that there should not
be discrimination against workers who are injured in the
course and scope of their employment. (1) Any employer
who discharges, or threatens to discharge, or in any man-
ner discriminates against an employee because he or she
has filed or made known his or her intention to file a claim
for compensation with his or her employer or an applica-
tion for adjudication, or because the employee has received
a rating, award, or settlement, is guilty of a misdemeanor
and the employee's compensation shall be increased by
one-half, but in no event more than ten thousand dollars
($10,000), together with costs and expenses not in excess
of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250). Any such em-
ployee shall also be entitled to reinstatement and reim-
bursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the
acts of the employer. ... 73
70. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
71. 1972 Cal. Stat. 1545 (S.B. 1157). The Legislative Counsel's Digest Note
to section 132a of the Labor Code states that the rationale behind the change to
the statute is to:
modifly] provisions of workmen's compensation law penalizing an em-
ployer for discharging or in any manner discriminating against em-
ployee for described benefits or actions taken by employee. Makes
comparable penalties applicable to workmen's compensation insurance
carriers who advise, direct, or threaten an insured in order to have
employee discharged for taking described action.
Id.
72. 1978 Cal. Stat. 4349 (A.B. 2945). Punitive damages are not available
under section 132a. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998);
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). Addi-
tionally, the remedies under section 132a of the Labor Code are cumulative.
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998). Therefore, the employee
would be entitled to reinstatement with back pay and to the increased benefit if
he or she was discharged. Id.
73. Id.
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Section 132a is designed to prevent retaliatory discrimi-
nation by employers against their employees who seek work-
ers' compensation remedies based on work-related injuries.74
Although section 132a does not contain express exclusivity
provisions,75 the exclusivity provisions of sections 3600-3602
of the California Labor Code have been interpreted by the
California Supreme Court to include wrongful termination
claims, making section 132a the statutory remedy for em-
ployees who are discriminated against based on a work-
related injury." Therefore, a broad reading of the general
policy considerations expressed in the preamble to section
132a and the language in section 3600 of the California Labor
Code, stating that the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
is vested with full power to determine finally all matters
specified in this section,77 makes it possible for an employer
to be in violation of section 132a even if he or she has not
violated any of the statute's specific provisions."
Section 132a has been interpreted to express "a policy
opposing all discrimination against workers based solely on
their having been injured in the course of employment."79
The California Supreme Court has held that an employee
who is terminated based on a disability arising out of a work-
related injury is limited to seeking redress against his em-
ployer under section 132a.8" Because section 132a serves a
remedial function by providing some compensation to an em-
ployee who is penalized for having suffered a work-related
injury, it is to be liberally construed.81
Prior to the 1992 and 1993 amendments to the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act,8" California courts uniformly held
that a claim of disability discrimination arising out of a work-
74. Raven v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 262 Cal. Rptr. 354, 364 (Ct. App.
1989).
75. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
76. See Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d
564 (Cal. 1978).
77. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3600 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
78. See Pickrel v. General Tel. Co., 252 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Ct. App. 1988).
79. Judson Steel Corp., 586 P.2d at 570.
80. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564
(Cal. 1978).
81. Id.
82. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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related injury was preempted by section 132a.83 However,
subsequent to the amendment to the FEHA providing for ap-
plication of "other" California laws "unless those laws pro-
vided less protection than the FEHA,"s4 the issue of whether
the FEHA or WCA laws are applicable to disability discrimi-
nation claims has arisen in the courts."9 In order to fully un-
derstand the implications of workers' compensation exclusiv-
ity provisions in light of the 1993 amendment to the FEHA,
an explanation of the FEHA is required. 6
B. California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
1. Overview and Purpose of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act
In 1959, California adopted a comprehensive police
power measure prohibiting discrimination in employment."
Subsequently, in 1980, that statute was repealed and re-
placed by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
("FEHA").8 s The FEHA applies to employers, employees, em-
ployment agencies and labor organizations. 9 It expresses the
declared policy of the State of California to protect the right
and opportunity of all employees to be free from discrimina-
tion in employment. 90 The statute recognizes:
the practice of denying employment opportunity and dis-
criminating in the terms of employment. .. foments do-
mestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of the fullest
utilization of its capacities for development and advance,
83. See Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App.
1994); Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1994);
Denney v. Universal City Studios, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170 (Ct. App. 1992); Fortner
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 409 (Ct. App. 1991); Meninga v. Raley's,
Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1989); Pickrel v. General Tel. Co., 252 Cal.
Rptr. 878 (Ct. App. 1988); County of Santa Barbara v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 167 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 1980).
Although decided after the 1992 amendment to the FEHA, the court in
Langridge v. Oakland Unified School District, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct. App.
1994), held that a claim of disability discrimination arising out of a work-
related injury was preempted by section 132a of the California Labor Code.
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
85. See discussion infra Part II.D.
86. See discussion infra Part II.B.
87. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-1600 (West 1989) (repealed 1980).
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
89. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
90. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
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and substantially and adversely affects the interest of em-
ployees, employers, and the public in general.9
Therefore, its purpose is to "provide 'effective remedies which
will eliminate such discriminatory practices.' 92
Under the FEHA, the right to be free from discrimina-
tion is declared to be a civil right.93 The FEHA expresses a
legislative policy that it is necessary to protect and safeguard
the right for an individual to hold employment without dis-
crimination.94 To advance this policy, the Legislature has
stated that the FEHA must be construed liberally. 5 If there
is an ambiguity that is not resolved by the legislative history
of the FEHA or other extrinsic sources, the court is required
to construe the FEHA so as to facilitate the exercise of juris-
diction by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission.96
2. Recent Amendments to the FEHA
In 1992, as a result of the federal Americans with Dis-
abilities Act,97 the FEHA was amended to provide employees
with protection against discrimination based on a disability.98
Consequently, section 12993(a) of the FEHA reads:
The provisions of this part shall be construed liberally for
the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing con-
tained in this part shall be deemed to repeal any of the
provisions of the Civil Rights Law or of any other law of
this state relating to discrimination because of race, relig-
ious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical dis-
ability, mental disability, medical condition, marital
status, sex or age.99
Additionally, in 1993, it was amended to provide that
"[n]othing contained in this part shall be deemed to repeal
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12921 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
94. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
95. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
96. See Brown v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1984). The Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission is now referred to as the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12925(b)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
97. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
98. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); see also discus-
sion infra Part II.B.2.a.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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any of the provisions of the Civil Rights Law or of any other
law of this state relating to discrimination... , unless those
provisions provide less protection to the enumerated classes of
persons covered under this part."'°
These amendments,'' which California courts have tra-
ditionally treated as an issue subject to workers' compensa-
tion exclusivity, implicate an employee's redress for a work-
related injury resulting in a disability over which he or she is
subsequently discriminated against. °2
a. Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on
the FEHA-the 1992 Amendment to the FEHA
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA")." 3 On July 26, 1992, it became effective for
employers with twenty-five or more employees and, as of July
26, 1994, extended to employers with fifteen or more employ-
ees. °4 The Act specifically recognized the compelling need to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities and for the integration of persons with disabilities
into the economic and social mainstream of American life."°'
It further recognized a need to provide clear, strong, consis-
tent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."'
Prior to 1992, the FEHA prohibited specific acts of dis-
crimination against persons with a physical handicap."7
However, in 1992, California amended its Fair Employment
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
102. See discussion infra Part IV.
103. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)). Under
the ADA, an employee is required to show: (1) that he or she has, or is per-
ceived to have, a disability; (2) that, despite the real or perceived disability, he
or she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable
accommodation; (3) but that the employer refused to provide such reasonable
accommodation; and (4) took adverse action (e.g. termination, demotion)
against him or her because of the disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112
(1994).
104. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
105. 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1994); see also 137 CONG. REC. S11076 (daily ed. July
8, 1991).
106. Id.
107. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989).
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and Housing Act to comport with the ADA. 08  The 1992
amendment was designed to broaden the rights of the state's
disabled community and give added vitality to the ADA. 09
Consequently, as of January 1, 1993, section 12920 of the
California Government Code includes physical disability as
one of the Act's protections against discrimination. 0 There-
fore, as of 1993, the FEHA has provided employees with pro-
tection against discrimination based on a disability."'
b. FEHA Preemption to Provide Employees
Protection from Discrimination in Employment-
the 1993 Amendment to the FEHA
In 1993, section 12993(a) of the FEHA was amended to
include the following phrase: "unless those provisions pro-
vide less protection to the enumerated classes of persons cov-
ered under this part.""' The addition of this phrase illus-
trates the intention of the legislature to have the FEHA
preempt any provision of state law that offers less protec-
tion."' The FEHA has now become an exception to other
laws, which are implicitly repealed unless they provide as
much protection as the FEHA. T' The legislative history of
the amendment of section 12993(a) indicates that the new
FEHA provision was to apply to discrimination in housing."'
However, the actual revision of section 12993(a) does not dis-
tinguish between housing and employment situations.
108. 1992 Cal. Stat. 3659 (A.B. 1286).
109. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(k) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); Cassista v.
Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1150 (Cal. 1993).
110. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12920 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
111. Id. However, protection against disability discrimination under the
FEHA is not absolute. See Wood v. County of Alameda, 875 F. Supp. 659 (N.D.
Cal. 1995). As the Americans with Disabilities Act (on which the FEHA and
workers' compensation standards are based) is a federal law, it preempts state
law to the extent that the state does not provide as much protection as the ADA
does against disability discrimination. Id. at 663. If a state law provides more
protection than the ADA, the state law is to apply. Id. at 664. Exclusive rem-
edy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are preempted by the ADA.
Id. at 665. However, as a state law, the FEHA does not automatically preempt
the Workers' Compensation Act.
112. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 1993 Cal. Stat. 6027 (A.B. 2244).
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C. Development of Case Law Implicating Discrimination
Claims Brought by Employees Against Their Employers
1. Broad Application of Section 132a to Provide
Employees with a Remedy Against Employers for
Termination-the Judson Steel Case
Although Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board"6 was decided nearly twenty years ago and
does not directly implicate the disability discrimination is-
sue,"7 it is cited in nearly every California case dealing with
the applicability of the exclusivity provisions of workers'
compensation laws to discrimination claims based on work-
related injuries."8 Specifically, the case presented the issue
of whether an employer who terminates an employee's sen-
iority rights and, ultimately, his employment, because of the
employee's absence from his job as the result of a work-
related injury, has engaged in unlawful discrimination within
the meaning of section 132a of the California Labor Code." 9
In Judson Steel, the employer appealed a Workers' Com-
pensation Appeals Board decision permitting the employee to
pursue a claim for discrimination under section 132a."'
However, the California Supreme Court upheld the decision
of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board."' Basing its
decision on the 1972 Amendment to section 132a providing
that "it is the declared policy of this state that there should
116. 586 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1978).
117. In Judson Steel, the plaintiff was not terminated because of a disability
for which the employer failed to make reasonable accommodation, but, rather,
for missing too much work because of being temporarily disabled as a result of
a work-related injury. Id. at 566.
118. See supra note 83; see also discussion supra Part II.A.4.b.
119. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d
564, 565 (Cal. 1978).
120. Id. at 566. The FEHA was not at issue in this case. The issue was
whether to apply section 132a to a work-related disability discrimination claim
or leave the employee without a remedy. Id. at 567.
121. Id. at 570. The employer made three arguments in support of its con-
tention that section 132a should not be applied. First, the employer argued
that the enumerated sections of section 132a limited the basis on which section
132a can be invoked. Id. at 568-69. Second, if section 132a were invoked in
this situation, the employee would be subject to mandatory reinstatement in
spite of any economic considerations of the employer. Id. at 569. And, third, it
argued that section 132a provides for the imposing of a penalty and, therefore,
must be strictly construed and cautiously applied. Judson Steel Corp. v. Work-
ers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564, 569-70 (Cal. 1978). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected all three arguments. Id. at 570.
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not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the
course and scope of their employment,"'22 the court held that
section 132a permitted the employee to bring a workers'
compensation claim against his employer for stripping him of
his seniority rights leading to his termination.2 '
The court reasoned that despite the fact that there was
no specific provision in section 132a covering the employee's
claim, the 1972 amendment provided for a broad application
of section 132a.12 ' This broad policy supports the theory that
"[t]he policy of protection which the workers' compensation
laws declare can only be effectuated if an employer may not
discharge an employee because of the employee's absence
from his job as the consequence of an injury sustained in the
course and scope of [his] employment."'25 Applying the broad
policy provision of section 132a, the court permitted the em-
ployee to pursue his discrimination claim under section
132a.
2 6
Judson Steel established what became the widely ac-
cepted interpretation of section 132a prior to the 1992 and
1993 amendments to the FEHA, expressing a broad policy
against discrimination of all employees who sustain indus-
trial injuries and not just those who exercise their rights un-
der the Workers' Compensation Act.
1 7 Up until recently, 28
California courts have uniformly utilized the Judson Steel
analysis to construe section 132a to apply to all employer dis-
crimination against workers injured in the course and scope
of their employment, including discrimination based on a
disability arising out of a work-related injury. 29
122. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
123. Judson Steel Corp., 586 P.2d at 570.
124. Id. at 568-69.
125. Id. at 570.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Arriaga v. County of Alameda, 892 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1995); Shoe-
maker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection
Dist., 729 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987).
128. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996).
129. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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2. Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation Laws for
Discrimination Claims Encompassed in
Compensation Bargain
a. Disabling Injuries Resulting from Termination
Considered Among the Risks Reasonably Within
the Compensation Bargain-the Shoemaker Case
In Shoemaker v. Myers,3 ° a former employee brought
several causes of action against his employer, including one
for violation of California's "whistleblower" statute,"' after
having been terminated by his employer."2 The employee at-
tempted to maintain a cause of action under the FEHA by
arguing that the whistleblower statute was distinct and
separate legislation which "preempted" workers' compensa-
tion laws."' In permitting the employee's cause of action un-
der the whistleblower statute, the California Supreme Court
held that since the whistleblower statute was more "specific,"
it preempted the more general Workers' Compensation Act
and permitted the employee's cause of action under the
FEHA."3
However, while the court permitted a cause of action un-
der the whistleblower statute, it concluded that disabling
injuries, whether physical or mental, arising from termina-
tion of employment are generally within the coverage of
workers' compensation and subject to its exclusive remedy
provisions."' Only when the discharge comes within an ex-
press or implied statutory exception or the discharge results
from risks reasonably deemed not to be within the compensa-
tion bargain are the workers' compensation exclusivity provi-
sions inapplicable."6 Therefore, the court stated that unless
the conduct at issue was distinct from that which arises out
of the normal employment relationship, an employee's exclu-
sive remedy is found under the Workers' Compensation
Act." 7  Considering the purpose of the whistleblower stat-
130. 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).
131. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19683 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
132. Shoemaker, 801 P.2d 1054.
133. Id. at 1065.
134. Id. at 1066-67.
135. Id. at 1056.
136. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Cal. 1990).
137. Id. at 1065.
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ute38 and its intention to cover conduct that does not arise
out of the normal employment relationship,"9 it need not be
seen as reasonably coming within the compensation bargain.
Thus, it is not preempted by workers' compensation laws. 4'
Shoemaker expresses the court's position on workers'
compensation exclusivity as of 1990.14" Although disability
discrimination claims under section 132a were not directly
implicated by this decision, the general principle of workers'
compensation exclusivity vis-A-vis the opportunity to collect
civil damages indirectly affects claims of discrimination for a
disability arising out of a work-related injury. In fact, subse-
quent appellate courts confronted with the issue of whether
redress for disability discrimination arising out of a work re-
lated injury is subject to workers' compensation exclusivity
have used the Shoemaker compensation bargain analysis to
preclude claims under the FEHA."'
b. Recent Appellate Court Decisions Utilizing the
Compensation Bargain Analysis11
In light of Judson Steel' and Shoemaker,4" a number of
California appellate courts have indicated that the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act 46 do not
bar a civil action for damages under the FEHA for discrimi-
138. Id. at 1066. The court found that the whistleblower statute was to ex-
pressly relate to state civil service and was intended to encourage and protect
the reporting of on-the-job or job-related unlawful government actions and to
effectively deter retaliation for such reporting. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1067.
141. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990). Shoemaker was de-
cided by the California Supreme Court on December 20, 1990. Id.
142. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.b.
143. See Langridge v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct.
App. 1994); Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App.
1994); Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1993).
For state appellate court cases decided after the 1993 amendment, see Andreac-
chi v. Price Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 941 P.2d
54 (Cal. July 9, 1997); City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156
(Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); Cammack v.
GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926
P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996). See also discussion infra Part II.D.
144. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564
(Cal. 1978).
145. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).
146. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600-3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
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nation in employment based on age, race, sex or religion."'
However, abundant decisional authority has established that
a claim of disability discrimination arising prior to the 1992
and 1993 amendments to the FEHA out of a work-related
injury is preempted by section 132a. "8 Even after the 1992
amendment to the FEHA, which amended the act to include
disability as a protected class against discrimination, "9 but
prior to its 1993 amendment, the appellate courts had barred
a FEHA action for discrimination in employment based on a
disability arising from a work-related injury.'50 Persuaded by
the rationale applied by the California Supreme Court in
Judson Steel, California appellate courts had unanimously
held that an employee's claim of disability discrimination
arising out of a work-related injury is preempted by the ex-
clusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation law."'
Three recent decisions applied the compensation bargain
analysis promulgated in Shoemaker 5' in determining the ap-
plicability of section 132a. These decisions are Langridge v.
Oakland Unified School District,5 ' Angell v. Peterson Trac-
tor' and Usher v. American Airlines.1 55
i. Langridge v. Oakland Unified School District
In Langridge, the California court of appeal for the first
district, Division 5, held that an employee's claims under the
FEHA for physical disability discrimination based on a work-
related injury were preempted by the exclusive remedy provi-
sions of workers' compensation laws.' Basing its decision on
the standard established in Shoemaker,'57 that the exclusive
remedy provisions of workers' compensation laws do not ap-
ply to employer conduct that does not constitute a risk rea-
147. See supra note 62.
148. See supra note 83; see also discussion supra Parts II.A.4.b, II.A.5.
149. See supra note 108.
150. See Langridge v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct.
App. 1994); Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App.
1994); Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1993).
151. Id.
152. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).
153. 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct. App. 1994).
154. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App. 1994).
155. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1993).
156. Langridge, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
157. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990); see also discussion su-
pra Part II.C.2.a.
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sonably encompassed within the workers' compensation bar-
gain, the court concluded that because termination based on
a disability arising out of a work-related injury is a risk rea-
sonably considered in the compensation bargain, section 132a
is applicable." 8
ii. Angell v. Peterson Tractor
In its analysis, the Langridge court cited Angell v. Peter-
son Tractor..9 decided by the California court of appeal for the
third district.6 ° The Angell court also found disability dis-
crimination to be within the compensation bargain contem-
plated by the workers' compensation legislation, reasoning
that because the Legislature, through section 132a of the La-
bor Code, specifically placed work-related disability discrimi-
nation within the scope of workers' compensation law, such
conduct is within the scope of the compensation bargain.16'
The court also reasoned that section 132a controls because it
is more specific than the FEHA.112 While section 132a pro-
vides remedies for a specific type of discrimination-based on
work-related injuries-the FEHA proscribes all employment
discrimination based on a physical handicap, whether or not
work-related.163 Therefore, the Angell court held that section
132a was to provide the exclusive remedy for an employee
discriminated against based on a disability arising out of a
work-related injury."M
iii. Usher v. American Airlines
The Angell court cited to Usher v. American Airlines,6 '
decided by the California court of appeal for the first district,
Division 3.166 In Usher, as in Angell, the Court found that
section 132a controlled because it is more specific than the
FEHA."' It reasoned that discrimination based on a disabil-
ity arising out of a work-related injury was, in effect, dis-
158. Langridge, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37.
159. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App. 1994).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 550.
162. Id. at 549-50.
163. Id. at 550.
164. Id. at 551.
165. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1993).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 338.
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crimination based on a work injury and that this type of dis-
crimination is "expressly covered" by section 132a.'68 There-
fore, pursuant to the exclusive remedy provisions of sections
3600 and 3602 of the California Labor Code, the employee is
barred from bringing a civil action for discrimination based
on the same work-related injury.'69 Using the rationale ap-
plied by the California Supreme Court in Shoemaker,7 ° the
Usher court held that "where the employment injury causes
the disability on which the discrimination claim is based, the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act apply."
7 1
Although all three of these cases were decided prior to
the 1993 amendment to the FEHA,171 they reflect the trend in
case law governing disability discrimination claims when the
disability is a result of a work-related injury. The appellate
courts had found that unless the conduct falls outside the
compensation bargain, section 132a is applicable. 7 3  How-
ever, the 1993 amendment went into effect as of January 1,
1994.14 Its implementation has spurred the current split in
the California appellate courts as to whether state FEHA
discrimination disability claims are still preempted by the
exclusive jurisdiction of the WCA 7 1
D. Disability Discrimination Claims After the 1993
Amendment to the FEHA-the Cammack and City of
Moorpark Decisions
Prior to the 1993 amendment, 6 the FEHA stated that
168. Id. at 340.
169. Id.
170. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990); see also discussion su-
pra Part II.C.2.a.
171. Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 339 (Ct. App.
1993).
172. Langridge and Angell were decided in 1994. Langridge v. Oakland Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct. App. 1994); Angell v. Peterson Tractor,
Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App. 1994). Usher was decided in 1993. Usher v.
American Airlines, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1993).
173. Langridge, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34; Angell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541; Usher, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d 335.
174. 1993 Cal. Stat. 6027 (A.B. 2244).
175. See City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); Cammack v. GTE Cali-
fornia, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968
(Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); see also discussion infra Part II.D.
176. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
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nothing in the FEHA should be deemed to repeal any Cali-
fornia law relating to discrimination because of a physical
disability"'7 However, the amendment effectuated the in-
verse proposition, making the FEHA the rule rather than the
exception whenever its provisions provided more protection
to an employee." 8 In one of the first cases interpreting the
1993 amendment, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California held that "the 1993 amendment to the
FEHA reverses prior doctrine that disability discrimination
claims stemming from a work-related injury fall exclusively
within the workers' compensation scheme," denying the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss his disability discrimination
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' However, it
was not until Cammack v. GTE California, Inc.8' and City of
Moorpark v. Superior Court,' also decided after the 1993
amendment to the FEHA went into effect, that the California
appellate courts had the opportunity to interpret the mean-
ing of the amendment.'82
Two divisions of the California court of appeals came to
opposite conclusions in interpreting the effect of the 1993
amendment on workers' compensation exclusivity for dis-
ability discrimination claims.' In Cammack, the Fifth Divi-
sion of the court of appeal for the second district held that
177. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
178. Id.
179. Gallo v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of California, 916 F. Supp. 1005
(S.D. Cal. 1995). Additionally, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California addressed this issue after Cammack and City of Moorpark in
Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Cal. 1996). In Buckley, the
court held that, "the plain language of the FEHA acts to repeal the exclusive
jurisdiction over employees alleging discrimination on the basis of a disability
incurred at work .... [and] plaintiff may bring an action for physical disability
discrimination pursuant to the California [FEHA] .... " Id. at 748.
180. 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
181. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 1996).
182. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998). Since Cam-
mack and City of Moorpark, the First Division of the court of appeal for the first
district decided Andreacchi v. Price Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Ct. App. 1997),
review granted, 941 P.2d 54 (Cal. July 9, 1997). Following the rationale prom-
ulgated in Cammack, the Andreacchi court held that, despite the recent
amendments to the FEHA, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for a
work-related disability discrimination claim. Id.
183. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); Cammack v. GTE Cali-
fornia, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968
(Cal. Nov. 26, 1996).
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despite the FEHA amendment, section 132a still provided the
exclusive remedy for an employee discriminated against for a
disability based on a work-related injury.' Alternatively, in
City of Moorpark, the Sixth Division of the court of appeal for
the second district held that the plain language of the FEHA
amendment implicitly repealed the applicability of workers'
compensation exclusivity, permitting an employee to go out-
side the workers' compensation system and sue for civil dam-
ages under the FEHA for his or her work-related disability
discrimination claim.'85
1. The Cammack Decision
On August 8, 1996, the California court of appeal for the
second district, Division 5, decided the case of Cammack v.
GTE California, Inc.'86 The plaintiff had alleged causes of ac-
tion based on a work-related injury. 7 for unlawful disability
discrimination in violation of the FEHA when he attempted
to return to work after being off on disability, was subse-
quently refused reasonable accommodation for his disability,
and, thereafter, terminated.'88 The plaintiff contended that
the 1992 and 1993 amendments to the FEHA and, specifi-
cally, section 12993(a) requires an employer to reasonably ac-
commodate persons disabled by work-related injuries and
that a cause of action for refusal to do so was not preempted
by the Workers' Compensation Act.' The appellate court
rejected the plaintiffs contention and affirmed the lower
court's ruling that the 1993 amendment to the FEHA does
not abolish the Workers' Compensation Act's preemption of a
work-related disability discrimination claim' and that sec-
184. Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
185. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996).
186. 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
187. The plaintiff had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Cammack, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 840.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 848.
190. Id. at 855. In deciding to reject plaintiffs contention that section
12993(a), as amended, should permit his claim under the FEHA, the court re-
viewed substantial legislative committee reports prepared in connection with
the adoption of section 12993 and found no reference made to the Workers'
Compensation Act, in general, or section 132a of the Labor Code specifically.
Id. at 851-52. No language in the FEHA mentions the Workers' Compensation
Act nor do the committee reports prepared prior to adoption of the amended
section 12993. Cammack v. GTE California Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 851-52
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tion 132a provides the employee's sole remedy for that type of
discrimination. 191
The court considered the premise that, generally, work-
ers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for a work-related
injury, even if "the employee is denied the right to seek re-
dress at law."'92 Therefore, while recognizing the judicially
and statutorily created exceptions to workers' compensation
exclusivity, 9 ' the court asserted that most all disabling inju-
ries arising from either a work-related injury or termination
are to be considered within the compensation bargain.' The
court considered the broad policy of section 132a 9' and rea-
soned that section 132a, read in conjunction with the statu-
tory exclusivity provisions of sections 3600-3602 of the Cali-
fornia Labor Code, required the court to find that the
amendments to the FEHA did not impliedly repeal section
132a preemption for work-related disability discrimination
claims.'96 Citing a litany of cases decided by California courts
prior to the 1993 amendment to the FEHA,'97 the court found
these decisions regarding disability discrimination claims to
be persuasive. A legitimate statutory construction, concludes
the court, is that section 132a would be applicable when the
disability and the discrimination arise in the workplace,
while the FEHA applies to discrimination, even in the work-
place, when the disability arises outside the employment con-
text.198
2. The City of Moorpark Decision
One month after Cammack, on September 26, 1996, in
City of Moorpark v. Superior Court,'99 the California court of
appeal for the second district, Division 6, issued a modified
version of its opinion previously filed on March 12, 1996, spe-
(Ct. App. 1996).
191. Id. at 855.
192. Id. at 843 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600, 3601, 3602; Arriaga v. County
of Alameda, 892 P.2d 150, 152 (Cal. 1995); Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054
(Cal. 1990); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987)).
193. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600, 3601, 3602; Arriaga v. County of Alameda,
892 P.2d 150, 152 (Cal. 1995); Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990);
Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987).
194. Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
195. Id. at 846.
196. Id. at 848.
197. Id. at 849-50.
198. Id. at 852.
199. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 1996).
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cifically rejecting the Cammack decision.2"' The court reiter-
ated its holding that the workers' compensation exclusivity
provisions of sections 132a and 3600-3602 of the California
Labor Code do not preclude an employee from suing for civil
damages under the FEHA. 20' This is the first, and currently
only state court case, which has held that the 1993 amend-
ment to section 12993(a) of the FEHA permits an employee
who is discriminated against based on a disability arising out
of a work-related injury to sue under the FEHA.20
The City of Moorpark court reasoned that since the
"unless" clause added to section 12993(a) of the FEHA is un-
ambiguous, there is no need for the courts to look beyond its
plain meaning.23 Therefore, reviewing the legislative intent
behind the 1993 amendment, as the Cammack court did, is
unnecessary."" Section 12993(a) expressly repeals those pro-
visions of the law that offer less protection than the FEHA. °0
Whereas the FEHA provides remedies to eliminate discrimi-
natory practices and a civil lawsuit for damages seeks to
make the victim whole, the Workers' Compensation Act pro-
vides significantly less monetary awards, nothing to compen-
sate an individual for pain and suffering, and no punitive
damages.2"6
The court then determined that since workers' compen-
sation, in fact, does provide less protection than the FEHA to
workers discriminated against based on a physical disabil-
ity,0 the FEHA should be available to an employee for pur-
200. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 161 (Ct. App.
1996).
201. Id. at 166.
202. Id. Gallo v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of California was decided by
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. 916 F. Supp.
1005 (S.D. Cal. 1995). Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co. was decided by the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California. 949 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Cal.
1996). The only other cases to be decided by the California appellate courts af-
ter the 1993 amendment to the FEHA are Andreacchi v. Price Co., 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d 854 (Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 941 P.2d 54 (Cal. July 9, 1997) and
Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review
granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996). Both Andreacchi and Cammack
held that the workers' compensation laws provide the exclusive remedy for an
employee's work-related disability discrimination claim.
203. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 160 (Ct. App.
1996).
204. Id. at 161.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 161-63.
207. Id. at 162.
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suing his or her disability discrimination claim."°8 Section
132a is not rendered superfluous by this reading of section
12993(a) of the FEHA because section 132a still covers claims
of discrimination based on work-related injuries.2 09 The court
asserted that, furthermore, "the anti-discriminatory protec-
tions of Labor Code section 132a remain available to those
workers whose claims fall outside the ambit of the FEHA."10
Therefore, the court held that, in light of the 1993 amend-
ment to section 12993(a) of the FEHA, an employee may seek
redress for his or her disability arising out of a work-related
injury under the FEHA."1'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Prior to 1993, California courts uniformly agreed that
the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions of sections
3600-3602 of the California Labor Code applied to disability
discrimination claims and, specifically, that section 132a of
the Labor Code provided an employee's exclusive remedy for
his or her discrimination claim based on a disability arising
out of a work-related injury. 12 Since the FEHA provided that
it was neither an exception to any other statutes nor in-
tended to repeal any other provisions of California law, 1' and
the California Supreme Court had broadly interpreted sec-
tion 132a to prohibit discrimination based on workplace inju-
ries, 14 the courts did not perceive any real conflict between
the FEHA and section 132a.215
Even when the FEHA was amended in 1992 to specifi-
cally provide for protection against disability discrimina-
tion,216 the courts still uniformly held that employees who
were discriminated against based on a disability arising out
of a work-related injury were limited to seeking redress un-
208. Id. at 166.
209. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 163 (Ct. App.
1996).
210. Id. (citing Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
586 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1978)).
211. Id. at 166.
212. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
213. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
214. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564
(Cal. 1978).
215. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
216. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a.
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der California's workers' compensation laws. 217 Even though
section 132a has never expressly provided a remedy for dis-
crimination based on a workplace disability, the expansive
reading it has been given by the California Supreme Court 218
continues to persuade California courts.219  Consequently,
even after the 1992 amendment to the FEHA providing em-
ployees with protection from disability discrimination, ° Cali-
fornia appellate courts still agreed that workers' compensa-
tion laws provided an employee's exclusive remedy for
discrimination based on a disability when that disability
arises out of a work-related injury.22'
However, the 1993 amendment to the FEHA makes it
the exception to other laws.2 Now, the FEHA is to control
whenever another state law provides less protection than the
FEHA does.2 While it appears clear by the plain language of
section 12993(a) that an employee discriminated against
based on a disability now has statutory authority to go out-
side the workers' compensation system and sue his or her
employer for civil damages, the appellate courts are split on
the issue.224 In the two state appellate court cases decided
since the enactment of the 1993 amendment to the FEHA
dealing with disability discrimination,' one court has held
that the workers' compensation system is still an employee's
exclusive remedy,226 while the other has read the amendment
to permit an employee to sue for civil damages. 227 This split
makes it unclear under which remedial system an employee
who is discriminated against based on a work-related dis-
ability can pursue his or her discrimination claim.
217. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.i-iii.
218. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564
(Cal. 1978).
219. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
220. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a.
221. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.i-iii.
222. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
223. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
224. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); Cammack v. GTE Cali-
fornia, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968
(Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); see also discussion supra Part II.D.
225. City of Moorpark, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156; Cammack, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837.
226. Cammack, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837.
227. City of Moorpark, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The disability discrimination issue will be heard before
the California Supreme Court this term.228 To be decided is
whether, in light of the recent amendments to the FEHA," 9
an employee who is discriminated against based on a work-
related disability is limited to pursuing a claim under section
132a of the California Labor Code or may pursue a civil claim
under the FEHA."3 ° At first blush, it may appear that the
California Supreme Court would have to outright reject es-
tablished doctrine in order to permit an employee to bring a
work-related discrimination disability claim under the
FEHA.2 31 However, the court need not do so. The court may
still find that an employee can sue his or her former em-
ployer under the FEHA for work-related disability discrimi-
nation by recharacterizing, rather than outright rejecting,
the precedent established by Judson Steel and Shoemaker.3 2
Limiting Judson Steel and Shoemaker to discrimination
claims which fall outside the ambit of the FEHA and paying
appropriate deference to the clear language of section
12993(a) of the FEHA as amended in 1992 and 1993, the
court is able to interpret section 12993(a) to provide employ-
ees with a civil remedy for disability discrimination, irrespec-
tive of whether the disability arises out of a work-related in-
jury.2
33
A. The "Source of the Disability" Distinction Prior to and in
Light of the 1992 and 1993 Amendments to the FEHA
Historically, the source of an employee's disability has
been the pivotal factor in determining whether he or she can
pursue a discrimination claim based on that disability under
section 132a of the Workers' Compensation Act or section
228. Andreacchi v. Price Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Ct. App. 1997), review
granted, 941 P.2d 54 (Cal. July 9, 1997); City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57
Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26,
1996); Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996),
review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996).
229. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
230. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App.
1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); Cammack v. GTE Cali-
fornia, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968
(Cal. Nov. 26, 1996); see also discussion supra Part II.D.
231. See discussion supra Part II.
232. See discussion supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.a.
233. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
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12993(a) of the FEHA.2 4 Prior to the 1992 and 1993 amend-
ments to the FEHA, California courts had drawn a clear line
on this issue .2" A work-related disability discrimination
claim is actionable under section 132a.2 36 Alternatively, a
nonwork-related disability discrimination claim is actionable
under the FEHA 3 ' However, since the underlying injury
giving rise to the disability for which an employee is dis-
criminated against is not considered a factor in determining
whether or not the employee was discriminated against
based on a disability either under section 132a of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act or 12993(a) of the FEHA 1 8 and the
FEHA now provides employees with more protection against
disability discrimination than does the workers' compensa-
tion system,13 the distinction between a work-related and
nonwork-related injury should not matter. An employee
should have the option to sue under the FEHA for work-
related disability discrimination.
1. The "Importance" of the Source of the Disability Prior
to the 1992 and 1993 Amendments to the FEHA
When an individual alleges he or she has been discrimi-
nated against based on a disability and seeks to collect dam-
ages from the employer for that discrimination, he or she is
required to show that he or she has, or is perceived to have, a
disability, that, despite the real or perceived disability, he or
she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job
with or without reasonable accommodation, but that the em-
ployer took adverse action (e.g., termination, demotion)
against him or her because of the disability.4 ' Nowhere does
the law require the employee to show how he or she got his or
her disability.241 The underlying source of the disability does
not figure into the equation.
However, by making workers' compensation laws the ex-
clusive remedy for work-related disability discrimination,
234. See discussion infra Parts IV.A. 1, V.A. l.a-c.
235. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
236. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.C.
237. See discussion supra Part II.B.
238. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
239. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.b.
240. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
241. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
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California courts have made the source of the disability an
additional factor. 42 While this additional factor does not di-
rectly implicate the standard of proof required for a disability
discrimination claim, it does affect the forum in which the
employee will be able to bring the claim. 43 In turn, the forum
affects the remedies available to the employee, if his or her
claim is successful. 44 Whereas an employee suing for dis-
ability discrimination under the FEHA has a wide array of
remedies available against his or her employer, the workers'
compensation system provides a much more limited remedial
scheme.245
a. When the Source of the Disability Is Work-
Related
If an individual is injured on the job and that injury re-
sults in a disability for which he or she is subsequently dis-
criminated against, prior to the 1993 amendment to the
FEHA, he or she was strictly limited to filing a claim under
section 132a of the California Labor Code.246 Although sec-
tion 132a claims for disability discrimination are decided by
using the same standards as under the FEHA or ADA, 47 the
potential recovery is much more limited.248 Under section
132a, an employee's recovery is limited to an increase of his
or her compensation award by one-half, but in no event more
than $10,000.249 In addition, an employee is entitled to back
pay and reinstatement. However, irrespective of the se-
verity of the underlying injury giving rise to the disability, an
employee will be limited to $10,000 for the work-related dis-
ability discrimination.251  Because workers' compensation
laws are designed to help rehabilitate employees-not punish
employers-punitive damages and injunctive relief are not
available for section 132a claims.252 Attorneys fees and costs
242. See discussion infra Part IV.A.l.a-c.
243. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
244. See discussion infra Part IV.A.l.a-b.
245. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.a-b.
246. See discussion supra Part II.A.5; see also supra note 83 and accompa-
nying text.
247. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
248. See discussion infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
249. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
250. Id.
251. Id..
252. Id.
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are limited to $250.253
b. When the Source of the Disability Is Not Work-
Related
Alternatively, if an employee is injured outside the
course and scope of his or her employment, subsequently be-
comes disabled from that injury and is thereafter discrimi-
nated against based on that disability, he or she can sue his
employer for civil damages under the FEHA.254 The remedial
goal of the FEHA is to restore an individual who proves dis-
crimination in violation of the act to the position or status he
or she would have enjoyed but for the defendant's wrongful
conduct.255 Under the FEHA, if an employee proceeds under
the Act in court, he or she is able to recover both compensa-
tory and punitive damages, as well as equitable and injunc-
tive relief.5 6 Back pay and future lost earnings are also
available remedies under the FEHA.5 7 If the employee pre-
vails, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs may be awarded by
the court.25
c. When the Source of the Disability Is an
Exacerbation of an Earlier Nonwork-Related
Injury
Deciding under which system an employee can sue be-
comes particularly difficult when an employee's disability
does not arise solely in the course and scope of his or her em-
ployment. An employee who is injured from an activity out-
side the course and scope of his or her employment that gives
253. Id.
254. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
255. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 836, 852
(N.D. Cal. 1986), afftd, 860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1988).
256. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998). See, e.g., Peralta
Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 801 P.2d 357
(Cal. 1990); Monge v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1986); Garcia
v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1985); Commo-
dore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 649 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1982).
257. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 836, 852
(N.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1988) (awarding back pay and
future lost earnings to disabled employee because employer failed to reasonably
accommodate employee's asthma); American Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment
and Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151 (Cal. 1982) (upholding back pay award for
individual with high blood pressure who was denied employment and accom-
modation).
258. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12965(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
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rise to a disability is typically permitted to sue his or her em-
ployer under the FEHA if he or she is discriminated against
based on that disability.59 However, if the employee becomes
disabled as a result of a subsequent injury which exacerbates
his or her original, nonwork-related injury, he or she may be
limited to seeking recourse against his or her employer
within the workers' compensation system."O This means that
while an employee with a strictly nonwork-related injury re-
sulting in a disability would have a cause of action under the
FEHA,' if his or her disability is one that is even somewhat
work-related, he or she will be limited in his or her recovery
to the same extent as an employee whose disability arises
solely out of his or her employment.262
2. In Light of the 1992 and 1993 Amendments to the
FEHA, the Source of an Employee's Disability Should
Not Limit Him or Her to Suing Under the Workers'
Compensation Act
Situations such as the third one outlined above illustrate
the inconsistency of having a distinction between a work-
related and nonwork-related injury giving rise to a disability.
Prior to the enactment of the FEHA, considering the source
of an employee's disability was a practical and effective
means of ascertaining whether the workers' compensation
system had jurisdiction over the claim.2 3  This is because
prior to the enactment of the FEHA, the workers' compensa-
tion system provided the only remedy available to a worker
for disability discrimination. 264 As a result, section 132a was
interpreted expansively so as to provide employees with re-
dress for discrimination by employers. 65
However, with the implementation of the FEHA and the
more expansive remedies it provides, 266 it no longer makes
sense to limit an employee to the workers' compensation sys-
tem's remedies for his or her disability discrimination claim.
259. See discussion supra Part IV.A.I.b.
260. See ESKENAZI, supra note 37, § 4:9.
261. See discussion supra Part IV.A.I.b.
262. See ESKENAZI, supra note 37, § 4:10.
263. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
264. See Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541, 553 (Ct. App.
1994).
265. Id.
266. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.b.
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Limiting a worker's remedies to minimal damages under the
workers' compensation system will not further the system's
purpose of allowing workers to recover damages for injuries
incurred in the course and scope of their employment.267 Ad-
ditionally, the compensation bargain of the workers' compen-
sation system will not be compromised because the disability
discrimination claims are covered under an alternative spe-
cific statute.268
Yet, up until the 1992 and 1993 amendments to the
FEHA, this distinction continued to be advanced by the ap-
pellate courts. 29 However, the 1992 and 1993 amendments to
the FEHA have made disability discrimination a clear part of
the protections intended to be covered by the FEHA.27° The
FEHA is now the rule rather than the exception. No distinc-
tion is made between work and nonwork-related injuries.
The FEHA specifically states that its purpose is to protect
against disability discrimination unless the protection it pro-
vides is less than an alternative state law.27'
B. The 1992 and 1993 Amendments to the FEHA Change the
Complexion of the Disability Discrimination Issue-Work-
Related Disability Discrimination Claims Should No
Longer Be Subject to Workers' Compensation Exclusivity
Prior to the enactment of the FEHA, the California Su-
preme Court broadly interpreted section 132a to express a
policy opposing all discrimination against workers based
solely on their having been injured in the course of employ-
ment.272 Despite the FEHA's enactment providing protection
against "physical handicap" discrimination,273 the courts still
found the workers' compensation system to provide the ex-
clusive venue for work-related disability discrimination
claims.274 Even when section 12993(a) of the FEHA was
amended in 1992 to provide for protection against disability
267. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
268. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West. 1989 & Supp. 1998).
269. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
270. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
271. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West. 1989 & Supp. 1998).
272. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564
(Cal. 1978).
273. In 1973, the Legislature amended the Labor Code to include physical
handicap. 1973 Cal. Stat. 2498 (A.B. 1126).
274. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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discrimination in particular,275 the courts still found workers'
compensation an employee's exclusive remedy for discrimina-
tion based on a work-related disability.276 However, the 1993
amendment, making the FEHA the rule rather than the ex-
ception in disability discrimination claims, changes the com-
plexion of the issue.
1. The 1993 Amendment to the FEHA Makes It an
Exception to Other Laws Which Provide Less
Protection to Employees Against Disability
Discrimination
a. The Plain Language of the FEHA Says Any
Provision of State Law Offering Less Protection
Than the FEHA Is Inoperable and Effectively
Preempted by the FEHA
The plain language of a statute prescribes its interpreta-
tion by the courts.277 To determine what a statute means, a
court is to first look at the words themselves, giving them
their usual and ordinary meaning. 278 When a statute is clear
and unambiguous on its face, the court is obliged to take the
statute as it finds it and not embark upon a quest to deter-
mine legislative intent.279
Section 12993(a) of the FEHA provides that "[n]othing
contained in this part shall be deemed to repeal any of the
provisions of the Civil Rights Law or of any other law of this
state relating to discrimination . . . , unless those provisions
provide less protection to the enumerated classes of persons
covered under this part."280 It clearly states that the FEHA is
to govern claims relating to discrimination when an alterna-
tive state law provides less protection.28' While the Cammack
court painstakingly reviewed the legislative history behind
the 1993 amendment of section 12993(a) and read it to sug-
275. 1992 Cal. Stat. 3659 (A.B. 1286).
276. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
277. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 160 (Ct. App.
1996) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1858 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998)).
278. See Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal.
1996).
279. Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 940-41 (Cal. 1990) (citing Lun-
gren v. Deukmajian, 755 P.2d 299 (Cal. 1988)).
280. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
281. Id.
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gest that the new FEHA provision was intended only to apply
to discrimination in housing,282 the plain language of the
statute does not make this distinction.283
Although the City of Moorpark court may have been a bit
dramatic in its assertion that section 12993(a) of the FEHA
provided "for a refreshing change, [a] statute that is clear
and intelligible ... [i]ts words do not beg to be understood,
nor do they defy comprehension,"284 the underlying rationale
for this statement comports with standard statutory inter-
pretation.8 5 If the Legislature had wanted to limit the 1993
amendment to housing discrimination it could have made it
clear in the statute. It is not the court's role to try and figure
out what the legislative intent behind amending section
12993(a) was when the statute can be clearly read on its
face.286 Therefore, the 1993 amendment to the FEHA should
be read literally to provide employees with protection against
disability discrimination.
b. Workers' Compensation System Provides Less
Protection Than the FEHA
The 1993 amendment to section 12993(a) of the FEHA
means that the FEHA effectively preempts any provision of
state law offering less protection. 287 Looking at the purpose of
the workers' compensation laws and the FEHA and compar-
ing the remedies available under each,288 it is clear that the
workers' compensation laws provide less protection than the
FEHA.
The purpose of the FEHA is "to provide effective reme-
dies which will eliminate ... discriminatory practices."289 A
party seeking to enforce a claim of discrimination under the
FEHA may pursue a number of remedies.2 9 The purpose of
these liberal remedies is to eliminate discriminatory prac-
tices and attempt to make the victim of discrimination
282. Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 851 (Ct. App.
1996).
283. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
284. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 160 (Ct. App.
1996).
285. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
286. City of Moorpark, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160.
287. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
288. See discussion supra Parts II.A-B, IV.A.l.a-b.
289. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
290. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
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whole.29' The FEHA specifically allows for remedies to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices. 9' Moreover, it provides the
possibility of, to some extent, virtually unlimited damages.29
The opportunity to bring an action in court, coupled with the
potential for a larger award of monetary damages, means
greater protection for a victim of discrimination.294
Conversely, the principal purpose of the workers' com-
pensation laws is to ensure an employee receives medical
treatment for his or her work-related injury and compensa-
tion for the time he or she is unable to work.95 Workers'
compensation benefits provide significantly smaller monetary
awards than do civil lawsuits."' Whereas a claimant suing
under the FEHA may have a variety of remedies available to
him or her, one suing under the workers' compensation laws
is much more limited in what he or she may recover.2 9 7
Therefore, not only does the purpose of each of the laws
support a finding that the FEHA affords an employee more
protection than the workers' compensation laws, but so do
the remedies available under each.
2. The 1992 and 1993 Amendments to the FEHA Make
the FEHA a Statutory Exception to Workers'
Compensation Exclusivity
While, traditionally, workers' compensation laws have
preempted other state laws, the 1993 amendment to section
12993(a) of the FEHA has made it so the FEHA preempts
other state laws providing less protection."' Since workers'
291. See, e.g., Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 649 P.2d 912
(Cal. 1982).
292. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
293. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
294. See Arriaga v. County of Alameda, 892 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1995). See also
Gallo v. Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 916 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
[T]he remedies available under the FEHA are more comprehensive in
both scope and in amount of recovery. In general, the remedies of the
workers' compensation act reflect its focus on the employment bargain;
the FEHA, by contrast, focuses more on the evils of discrimination.
Further, the FEHA allows the claimant to bring an action in court,
with the accompanying incidents of judicial process.
Id. at 1009.
295. See O'Brien, supra note 34, at 1.
296. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
297. See discussion supra Part IV.A.l.a-b.
298. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
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compensation laws provide less protection than the FEHA,
they are expressly preempted by section 12993(a) of the
FEHA.299 Read in conjunction with the 1992 amendment to
the FEHA, making mental and physical disability specific
protected classes, the 1993 amendment has made the FEHA
a specific statutory exception to workers' compensation ex-
clusivity. °°
a. Discriminatory Conduct Based on a Specific
Statutory Exception to the Workers'
Compensation Laws Is Not Subject to Workers'
Compensation Exclusivity
By reading the 1992 and 1993 amendments to the FEHA
as creating a specific statutory exception to the workers'
compensation laws, the California Supreme Court may hold
that an employee suing his or her employer for work-related
disability discrimination may do so under the FEHA, without
violating any long standing principles of workers' compensa-
tion exclusivity.
The workers' compensation laws were enacted prior to
the FEHA to provide a specific remedy for employer dis-
crimination based on work-related injuries. Therefore, the
California Supreme Court, prior to the 1992 and 1993
amendments to the FEHA, interpreted section 132a broadly
as the exclusive remedy for any type of employer discrimina-
tion against workers because of injuries occurring in the
course of and arising out of their employment." 1 However, as
of 1990, the Court had established specific limitations on the
"broad" scope of section 132a.3 °2 The Shoemaker court specifi-
cally held that when discrimination "comes within an express
or implied statutory exception or results from risks deemed
not to be within the compensation bargain,"3°3 the workers'
compensation exclusivity provisions are inapplicable. There-
fore, by identifying the FEHA as an express statutory excep-
tion, the underlying rationale of the Shoemaker decision is
not compromised.
299. See discussion supra Part IV.B.I.b.
300. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
301. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564
(Cal. 1978).
302. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).
303. Id. at 1059.
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C. Reconciling the Cammack and City of Moorpark
Decisions
The Cammack and City of Moorpark courts have come to
diametrically opposed conclusions as to whether, in light of
the 1992 and 1993 amendments to the FEHA, work-related
disability discrimination claims should still be subject to
workers' compensation exclusivity."4 Therefore, it will be dif-
ficult for the California Supreme Court to reconcile these two
cases without rejecting at least one line of reasoning. How-
ever, because the Cammack decision fails to appropriately
recognize the implications of the 1993 amendment to section
12993(a) of the FEHA and City of Moorpark not only recog-
nizes the implications of the revised 12993(a), but also the
public policy sought to be advanced by the amendments, the
court should follow the rationale of City of Moorpark and hold
that an employee discriminated against based on a work-
related disability can sue his or her employer for civil dam-
ages under the FEHA.
1. The Problems with the Cammack Decision
a. The Cammack Court Overemphasizes Precedent
and Underemphasizes the Recent Amendments to
the FEHA
In holding that an employee who alleges discrimination
based on a work-related injury is limited to the workers'
compensation system, the Cammack court has overempha-
sized precedent and underemphasized the recent amend-
ments to the FEHA."30 The court's' analysis is laden with
cites to cases decided prior to the 1993 amendment to the
FEHA. °6 While certainly the court would be bereft if it did
not consider prior case law in its analysis, by placing such a
strong emphasis on precedent without considering the plain
language of the revised FEHA, it fails to take into account
that the recent amendments to the FEHA change the law.
304. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 160 (Ct. App.
1996); Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
See also discussion supra Part II.D.1-2.
305. Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
306. Id. at 849-50.
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b. The Court Mistakenly Relies on the Legislative
History Rather Than the Plain Language of
Section 12993(a)
Rather than looking at the plain language of section
12993(a) of the FEHA, the Cammack court mistakenly relies
on the legislative history of the amendments to the FEHA
and its own review of substantial legislative committee re-
ports in determining that there has been no "implied repeal"
of workers' compensation exclusivity. °7 There has been no
implied repeal of workers' compensation exclusivity, nor
could there be, because the amendment to section 12993(a)
expressly repeals any other laws which provide less protec-
tion against discrimination °8 While the Cammack court ex-
pressed its wish that the Legislature would have listed the
California state laws that are repealed by the amendment to
the FEHA"' it would have been absurd for the Legislature to
do so. For the Legislature to have listed each and every state
law it intended to be repealed by the 1993 amendment to sec-
tion 12993(a) would have been inordinately burdensome and,
inevitably, incomplete. Thus, while the Legislature did not
specifically indicate which laws provided less protection than
the FEHA, it is clear that workers' compensation laws pro-
vide less protection. 10 Therefore, the FEHA should be ap-
plied to work-related disability discrimination claims.
c. The Cammack Rationale Perpetuates the
Outdated Distinction Between Work-Related and
Nonwork-Related Disabilities
If the California Supreme Court follows the Cammack
court's line of reasoning, the distinction between a work-
related and nonwork-related disability will be perpetuated. "'
While the distinction made sense prior to the enactment of
the FEHA and may have even been important up until the
1992 amendment to the FEHA providing for protection
against disability discrimination, in light of the 1992 and
1993 amendments to the FEHA, it no longer makes sense.
307. Id. at 848.
308. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
309. Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 851 (Ct. App.
1996).
310. See discussion supra Part IV.B.I.b.
311. See discussion supra Part IV.A.l.a-b.
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While the Cammack court found that construing section 132a
to apply to work-related disabilities and section 12993(a) of
the FEHA to apply to nonwork-related disabilities "a per-
fectly legitimate consistent construction,""' it would not be
consistent to do so. The recent amendments to the FEHA
have made disability discrimination a clear part of the pro-
tections intended to be covered by the FEHA. 13 No distinc-
tion is made between work and nonwork-related injuries.
The FEHA specifically states that its purpose is to protect
against disability discrimination unless the protection it pro-
vides is less than an alternative state law. 14
2. The Rationale of the City of Moorpark Court Makes
More Sense
a. The City of Moorpark Court Balances Precedent
with the Recent Amendments to the FEHA
In City of Moorpark, the court found that the 1993
amendment to section 12993(a) of the FEHA, stating that
any provision of state law offering less protection than the
FEHA is preempted by the FEHA, is unambiguous and clear
on its face. 15 Where the ambiguity lies, if any, is in inter-
preting whether the workers' compensation exclusivity laws
provide less protection to employees discriminated against
based on a disability."6 The court considered the history of
section 132a and the most recent appellate court decisions
which had found than an employee's claim of disability dis-
crimination to be preempted by workers' compensation exclu-
sivity, 1 7 but found that the recent amendments to the FEHA
clearly express the legislature's intent to make the FEHA an
option to employees discriminated against based on a work-
related disability.1 8
312. Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 852 (Ct. App.
1996).
313. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
314. Id.
315. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 160 (Ct. App.
1996).
316. Id. at 161-63.
317. Id. at 159.
318. Id. at 161.
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b. The Court Appropriately Considers the Plain
Language of Section 12993(a)
Unlike the Cammack court which, despite clear lan-
guage, analyzed the legislative history behind the 1993
amendment to section 12993(a) of the FEHA, the City of
Moorpark court appropriately considered the plain meaning
of section 12993(a).319 This consideration comports with the
321way in which statutes are to be read by the courts. 0 When a
statute is clear and intelligible on its face, the meaning of
those words control.3 11 The plain language of section 12993(a)
reads that if any provision of state law offers less protection
than the FEHA, the FEHA preempts that provision.322 There-
fore, the legislative history of this amendment indicating that
it may only be meant to refer to provisions of California's
housing laws is not binding on the courts. Since the plain
language of the FEHA seeks to protect individuals from both
employment and housing discrimination and section 12993(a)
does not distinguish between the two,323 the City of Moorpark
court correctly determined that the 1993 amendment pre-
empted workers' compensation exclusivity laws for work-
related disability discrimination claims.
c. The Court Implicitly Rejects the Outdated
Distinction Between Work-Related and Non Work-
Related Disability Discrimination to the Extent It
Makes Workers' Compensation the Exclusive
Remedy
By holding that an employee can sue under the FEHA for
work-related disability discrimination, the City of Moorpark
court implicitly rejects the distinction between work-related
and nonwork-related disabilities."4 However, the court does
not altogether reject the use of section 132a in all discrimina-
tion claims.2 Only disability discrimination claims where
319. Id.
320. Id. at 160 (citing Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913
P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996)).
321. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 160 (Ct. App.
1996). See also supra note 279 and accompanying text.
322. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
323. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
324. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 163 (Ct. App.
1996).
325. Id.
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the underlying disability is a result of a work-related injury
and the FEHA is an option for the employee are to be permit-
ted under the FEHA.326 The anti-discriminatory protections
of section 132a are intended to "remain available to those
workers whose claims fall outside the ambit of the FEHA."
327
It is important to ensure that employees discriminated
against based on a disability are able to seek recourse against
their employers for wrongful conduct. Therefore, the City of
Moorpark distinction is a good one. Employees would be
given the option to sue under the FEHA, but if they were un-
able to do so because of the number of employees employed
by their employer,328 they would still be permitted to invoke
the protections of section 132a.
V. PROPOSAL
The California Supreme Court should permit the appli-
cation of the FEHA to all disability discrimination claims
over which the Department of Fair Employment and Housing
has jurisdiction, including those where the injury giving rise
to the disability is work-related. If the court upholds the City
of Moorpark decision, individuals who have been discrimi-
nated against by an employer as a result of a disability will
no longer be forced to file their virtually identical claims un-
der different remedial systems simply because of where the
underlying injury occurred. Workers will have the choice to
file under the FEHA and have the opportunity to take advan-
tage of the liberal protections it provides. Additionally,
making the FEHA available to individuals who are discrimi-
nated against based on a work-related disability, will elimi-
nate the need for the forum (whether it be the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board or the Department of Fair Em-
ployment and Housing) to determine how a claimant got his
or her disability. Therefore, instead of spending time deter-
mining how the individual got his or her disability, the forum
will be able to spend its time considering the merits of the
claimant's disability discrimination claim.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. The Fair Employment and Housing Act is applicable to employers with
five or more employees, whereas the workers' compensation system is applica-
ble to all employers, irrespective of the number of workers they employ. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Further, permitting an individual to bring his or her
claim under the FEHA for work-related disability discrimina-
tion will not render section 132a superfluous. Section 132a
would remain an option for individuals who either decide
that pursuing their claim under the FEHA would be too time
consuming, 3" expensive or difficult,33 ° or are unable to pursue
their claim there because it falls outside the ambit of the
FEHA. The proposal is not to eliminate section 132a for
work-related disability discrimination claims, but, rather,
eliminate workers' compensation exclusivity in this area.
In light of the recent amendments to the FEHA, ex-
panding the FEHA to cover disability discrimination, a
claimant should have the option to pursue his or her reme-
dies available under the FEHA. Giving the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing and the Workers' Compensa-
tion Appeals Board concurrent jurisdiction over work-related
disability discrimination claims would permit an individual
to assert his or her rights under the FEHA without necessar-
ily precluding him or her from seeking redress under the
Workers' Compensation Act. This would be an equitable way
to reconcile the historically broad interpretation of section
132a with the recent amendments to section 12993(a) so as to
recognize the importance of each remedy without outright
rejecting one or the other.
The purpose of the 1992 and 1993 amendments to the
FEHA was to include disability discrimination amongst the
civil rights protected under the FEHA."3 ' No distinction was
made between work-related and nonwork-related disabilities,
presumably because this distinction did not matter. While
329. Generally, disability discrimination claims filed at the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing usually take longer than a section 132a claim
filed in the workers' compensation system. This is primarily because of the fil-
ing requirements at the Department of Fair Employment and Housing which,
once fulfilled, usually lead to litigation of the case in the judicial court system.
Cases in the judicial court system can take several years to settle or go to trial.
330. At least one difficulty that a claimant may face is finding an attorney to
take his or her case. Given the difficulty of proving discrimination claims, an
individual with few financial resources may find it difficult, if not impossible, to
find legal counsel who would be willing to take his or her case on a contingency
basis. However, it can be just as difficult to secure representation by a workers'
compensation attorney for a section 132a claim. Since workers' compensation
attorneys are limited in the amount of attorneys' fees they can recover, they do
not usually find section 132a claims desirable. This, too, can have preclusive
effect on an individual's claim.
331. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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permitting workers to sue under the FEHA will increase an
employer's liability for work-related disability discrimination
claims, such an increase in liability will better prevent dis-
ability discrimination from taking place altogether. If em-
ployers are able to continue to take advantage of workers'
compensation exclusivity provisions to substantially limit an
individual's recovery,332 it is unlikely that they will be de-
terred from discriminating against the disabled. Without de-
terrence, neither the goals of the Americans with Disabilities
Act nor the FEHA-to eliminate disability discrimination in
employment-are recognized.
However, as a practical matter, since the appellate
courts have come to conflicting conclusions as to whether
workers' compensation exclusivity should preempt a work-
related disability discrimination claim under the recently
amended FEHA and the California Supreme Court has yet to
decide this issue,333 potential claimants would be wise to si-
multaneously file their disability discrimination claims under
the state workers' compensation system, the state FEHA and
the federal ADA. This way, if the Supreme Court decides to
permit work-related disability discrimination claims to be
brought under the FEHA, a claimant will not be precluded
from bringing his or her claim under the FEHA because his
or her statute of limitations has ran. Alternatively, in the
event that the court does decide to limit work-related dis-
ability discrimination claims to the workers' compensation
system, a claimant's cause of action is protected under theADA. 334
VI. CONCLUSION
The law, like the society it reflects, is not static. The re-
cent amendments to the FEHA reflect the public's desire to
332. A maximum of $10,000 in penalties, plus back pay and reinstatement, is
a small price for an employer to have to pay for discriminating against a dis-
abled employee. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
333. Andreacchi v. Price Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Ct. App. 1997), review
granted, 941 P.2d 54 (Cal. July 9, 1997); City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57
Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26,
1996); Cammack v. GTE California, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996),
review granted, 926 P.2d 968 (Cal. Nov. 26, 1996).
334. See Wood v. County of Alameda, 875 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Workers' compensation exclusivity does not preclude a claim under the federal
ADA for work-related disability discrimination. Id. at 664.
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combat disability discrimination in employment. While
workers' compensation exclusivity may have made sense
when the workers' compensation system provided individuals
with their only redress for disability discrimination, in light
of the recent amendments to the FEHA, it no longer does. By
permitting a worker to file his or her work-related disability
discrimination claim with the Department of Fair Employ-
ment and Housing, the California Supreme Court can ensure
that the recent amendments to the FEHA are given the
weight to which they are entitled. The court has the oppor-
tunity to revolutionize a field of law which, despite evolution
in the law of disability discrimination, has managed to re-
main stagnant. Hopefully, it will seize the opportunity.
Linda J. Lorenat
